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Abstract 
Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian or correlated equilibrium to analysis of 
strategic interaction, requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and 
opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available. 
The proposed notions of subjective games, and subjective Na.sh and correlated equi­
libria, replace unavailable objective knowledge by subjective assessments. When playing 
such a game repeatedly, subjective optimizers will converge to a subjective equilibrium. 
We apply this approach to some well known examples including a single multi-arm bandit 
player, multi-person multi-arm bandit games, and repeated Cournot oligopoly games. 
•The authors wish to acknowledge valuable conversations with Eddie Dekel-Tabak and other seminar
participants of the 1993 Summer in Tel Aviv Workshop, the University of California, San Diego, the 
California Institute of Technology, and the University of Chicago. This research was supported by NSF 
Economics, Grant Nos. SES-9022305 and SBR-9223156, and by the Division of Humanities and Social 
Sciences of the California Institute of Technology. This is an extended version of the paper entitled 
"Bounded Learning Leads to Correlated Equilibrium" (see Kalai and Lehrer (1991)). 
1 . Introduction
The notions of a subjective game and subjective equilibria, formulated in this 
paper, model strategic interaction in uncertain complex dynamic environments. In 
such situations, players often possess only partial knowledge of the game. 
Therefore, classical game theoretic approaches, where a significant amount of 
objective knowledge is assumed, are unrealistic, even for fully rational players. 
Under the subjective approach, proposed in this paper, each individual player 
replaces missing objective knowledge by subjective assessments, which he uses in 
computing an optimal strategy. Following these subjectively optimal strategies, the 
players eventually converge to a subjective equilibrium. 
The proposed subjective model is drastically different from the Nash (1950) 
and Harsanyi (1967) models. In Nash's formulation, precise, detailed information, 
like the set of opponents and their strategies, is assumed to be known to every 
player. In Harsanyi's extension of Nash to Bayesian games, each player assigns the 
objective correct probability distribution to all conceivable games that may be 
played, and within each such game he knows the set .of opponents and their 
strategies. 
The subjective model departs from Nash and Harsanyi in two important ways. 
First, players replace missing knowledge by subjective assessments which are not 
assumed to be correct nor to coincide with each other's. Second, an individual 
player does not attempt to assess the complete game, i.e., nature's moves, the set of 
all possible opponents, and their strategies. He restricts himself to aggregate data 
sufficient for computing his best strategy. In other words, the player views his 
strategy choice in the game as a one person decision problem. 
Nevertheless, the proposed subjective approach can be also thought of as an 
extension of Nash or Harsanyi. When the subj ective assessments of the players are 
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sufficiently complete and coincide with the true game and chosen strategies, the 
subjective equilibria proposed coincide with the corresponding (objective) Nash 
equilibria. 
To separate the objective and the subjective data, our model of an n-person 
subjective game consists of two components. The first is a standard n-person · 
infinitely repeated stochastic-outcome game with discounted future payoffs and 
partial monitoring. It describes the actual  game that will be played, i .e. the real 
strategies and information available to the individual players throughout the game, 
as well as their payoff functions. However, since the players do not fully know this 
real game; a second component describes their individual subjective conjectures 
regarding payoff-relevant events in their own portion of the game. 
These conjectures are described by each player through an individual 
environment response function. Such a function assigns probabilities to all the 
individual outcomes he may encounter in every stage of the game and for every 
action he may take. In other words, it is the individual decision tree that he believes 
to be encountering in the real game by the opponents strategies, whatever they may 
be. Clearly, the real game and actual opponents' strategies induce on him an 
objective environment response function and it is unlikely that his subjective function 
coincides with the objective one. 
The real game and the vector of n subjective environment response functions 
form the subjective game. A vector of n-strategies of the real game  is subjectively 
rational if each individual's strategy is optimal relative to the individual's subjective
environment response function. The vector is a subjective equilibrium if in addition
to being subjectively rational, it has a belief-confinnation property. That is, the
subjective probability assigned by a player to any event observable to him in the play 
of the game coincides to the true probability induced by the real game and chosen 
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strategies. 
Our convergence result gives a long run justification to the belief-confirmation 
property. Assuming that the players start with subjectively rational strategies, under 
sufficient conditions relating their beliefs with the truth, Bayesian updating will lead 
them eventually to beliefs which are confirmed. In other words, they will converge 
to a subjective equilibrium. 
Before continuing with the general model, and its relationship to earlier 
literature, we illustrate our approach and concepts through an n-person, infinitely­
repeated Coumot game with differentiated products. This game may be thought of 
as a multi-product extension of the Porter (1983) model, used later by Green and 
Porter (1984) and by Abreu, Pearce and Staccheti (1986). 
At the beginning of every period, each of the n-producers decides on a non­
negative quantity of his own good to be produced for the coming period. For each 
fixed n-vector of chosen production levels, there is a fixed probability distribution 
determining a random vector of n individual prices for the n-producers. Each 
producer is informed of his price realization, with which he can compute his period's 
profit. The game continues in this manner where, prior to every period, each 
producer's strategy may depend on his own history of past production levels and 
realized prices. There is a high level of imperfect monitoring here since a player 
sees only his own realized prices. But even if he saw the prices of others he may 
still not be able to infer opponents' quantities. The general model presented in the 
body of the paper allows for a large variety of information systems, ranging from 
perfect, full information to only learning one's own payoff. 
In order to explain and contrast the subjective approach with existing 
objective ones, we consider the problem of determining an optimal strategy from a 
producer's viewpoint. The uncertainties faced by him are many. He must know the 
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market demand function. This demand function depends, however, on the 
production levels of all his competitors. For this purpose he must identify all related 
products. He must therefore know the competitors capable of producing these 
related products, their production capabilities, their information structures, their 
utility functions, etc. For example, a soft drink producer must have objective 
knowledge regarding production possibilities, information systems, and strategies of 
a ll other soft drink producers and of producers of related products--e.g., fruit juice, . 
milk, and their related products. A naive version of Nash approach will assume that 
the player and all his opponents know major parameters of this complex game and 
with this -common knowledge somehow contemplate their way to one selected Nash 
equilibrium. 
The above assumption, that all the ingredients of the game are known, seems 
non-realistic here. In order to improve it one inay try to resort to Harsanyi's 
extension to Bayesian games. In this model the players consider all the possible 
values of parameters of the above unknown game, and possess common knowledge 
of the prior probability distribution by which nature selected the actual game played. 
Within each possible game each player somehow selects a strategy which is best 
response to the profile of strategies selected by all various types of his opponents in 
all possible games. Thus by some process of contemplation players arrive to one 
large vector of strategies, which is a Bayesian equilibrium of the giant game. This 
concept seems even less realistic since it requires objective knowledge over a much 
larger space. In addition, it stresses the rationality assumption to an unrealistic level 
for modeling people,s behavior. 
The subjective approach to the problem, which we proceed to describe now, 
also makes non-realistic assumptions on the knowledge and rationality of the players. 
However, it is less demanding than existing models and, in this sense, presents a 
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move in the right direction. 
Rather than attempting to model the parameters of all potential producers of 
related products, the subjective player will be assessing only the environment 
response function, induced on him by the real game and real opponents. Such a 
function specifies a probability distribution over the prices he may realize, in every 
stage, and for every one of his production levels. Two facts are important to notice. 
First, the real game and opponents' strategies induce on him a real environment 
response function which is usually unknown to him. Second, whatever the real game 
and opponents' strategies are, finding an optimal strategy in the game is equivalent 
to finding ·an optimal strategy relative to the induced environment response function. 
In other words, the environment response function summarizes all the payoff 
relevant uncertainties of the game into a one person decision problem. 
It follows that assessing the environment response function, instead of the 
game and equilibrium strategies, involves no loss of generality. In addition, on 
practical grounds, the environment response function may be easier to assess. It is 
defined over a drastically smaller space. Moreover, many different games give rise 
to the same environment response function and they may be considered as one. 
The above analysis leads to the incorporation of the subjective environment 
response functions into the formal model. A subjective version of our Cournot 
game consists of the real repeated Cournot game, with an n-vector of subjective 
environment response functions assessed by the individual players. 
A vector of strategies in the above game is subjectively rational if each player 
strategy, i.e . ,  dynamic production plan, is optimal against his subjective environment 
response function, i.e. , his conjectured price responses to quantities produced by him 
at different stages. In a subjective Nash equilibrium, he has belief-confirmation in 
addition to the subjective optimization above. This means that, for his chosen 
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production levels, the subjective probabilities be assigns to realized prices coincide 
with the objective probabilities, i.e., the ones generated by the competitors chosen 
strategies in the actual market. 
While the belief-confirmation condition just stated is non-realistic for 
interactions that have just started, it is natural for long, ongoing interactions. 
Indeed, our convergence result describes sufficient conditions under which subjective 
optimizers must converge with time to play a subjective equilibrium. Due,  however, 
to the possibility of imperfect monitoring, the limit may be a subjective correlated 
equilibrium (see Aumann (1974, 1987), Fudenberg and Tirole (1992), and Myerson 
(1991)) rather than subjective Nash equilibrium. The past play that has lead them to 
equilibrium turns out to serve as a natural, unavoidable correlation device (see 
Lehrer (1991) for a study of this phenomenon). In our Cournot example, 
dependencies in the stochastic realizations of past market prices serve as a device 
correlating players' future beliefs and strategies. 
The need to distinguish subjective from objective knowledge in social 
interaction is not new or unique to this paper. Our notion of subjective equilibrium 
has its roots already in Van Hayek ( 1937). He proposes that, at equilibrium, "the 
individual subjective sets of data correspond to the objective data, and . .  . in 
consequence the expectations in which plans were based are born out by the facts." 
Since Van Huyck, other economists have advocated and used such subjective 
notions, see for example Hahn ( 1973). 
Also the newer literature on game theory contains an increasing number of 
concepts reducing the objective-knowledge assumed by Nash, and moving in the 
direction of subjective equilibrium. Rationalizable equilibria, see Bernheim (1984) 
and Pearce (1987), and the more recent Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) 
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rationalizable conjectural equilibria, are such examples. The notions most closely 
related to the ones proposed here are by Battigalli (1987) (see also Battigalli and 
Guaitoli ( 1988) and Battigalli, Gilli and Molinari (1992)), the self-confirming 
equilibrium of Fudenberg and Levine (1993), and the earlier version of 
subjective-equilibrium proposed in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a). Our convergence 
result is closely related to earlier Bayesian learning papers, for example Jordan 
(1991), Kalai and Lehrer (1993b). 
The Notions of subjective Nash and subjective correlated equilibria proposed 
here generalize the earlier concepts in several ways. First, unlike the model 
proposed· here, the papers just cited assume that the game is known and uncertainty 
is restricted to opponents' choice of strategies. Second, while some of the earlier 
papers assumed perfect monitoring of opponent's actions, the current paper does 
not. As a consequence the resulting notion of subjective equilibrium is more
general. Also, our formal presentation of the concepts is developed through a 
model of infinitely repeated imperfect-monitoring stochastic-outcome game, while 
the earlier notions were defined on different classes. For example, self-confirming 
equilibrium was developed for finitely repeated but general extensive form games. It 
turns out however, that all the notions involved are natural enough and as a result, 
the modification of the equilibrium concepts as we move from one class of games to 
another, is fairly straightforward. We illustrate the formulation of subjective games 
and equilibria for general extensive form games in Section 6. 
In recent years, researchers have been making heavy use of Nash equilibria to 
predict outcomes of social strategic interaction. An excellent example is modern
industrial organization theory. Such analysis is carried in two stages. First the 
analyst formulates an abstract game describing the real situation. Then, assuming 
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that the same game is formulated by all the players, be computes its Nash equilibria 
as the set possible outcomes. 
More recently, however, researchers are more cautious in using the above 
approach. It is recognized that Nash analysis is sensitive to the specification of the 
game and, thus, its predictions are not robust when game formulation is subjective. 
The problem is especially severe since it involves compounded lack of robustness 
where players mutually rely on each other's correct formulation. For example, if all 
the players formulated the game correctly but all of them except player A thought 
that player A's model is different, it is likely to lead them to change their choice of 
strategies. · Worse yet, even at higher levels, the fact that player A believes that 
another player, B, formulates differently, may cause a significant change of strategies 
on the part of A's opponents. 
Under the subjective approach the robustness issue is less severe. Here, the 
choice of a strategy by a player does not rely on game specifications of others, but is 
allowed to depend on independent subjective primitives. Thus, the compounding 
effect of non-robustness due to mutual reliance on correct specifications is 
eliminated. 
Naturally, eliminating the assumption of the common availability of objective 
knowledge results in a significant reduction in prediction power. This is seen by the 
fact that the set of subjective equilibrium of a given game is in general larger than 
the set of Nash equilibria. We do not view this as a serious loss since we do not 
think that there was a real prediction power in the first place, because of the 
robustness issue. 
We feel that a better prediction power can be obtained under the subjective 
approach provided that the analyst collects more data about the subjective beliefs 
players hold. The body of this paper contains such preliminary illustrations. For 
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example, when players believe that they are too small to affect market prices, the 
resulting subjective equilibrium of a finite player Cournot game yields competitive 
production. In another example, dealing with a homogeneous product dynamic 
Cournot oligopoly game, correct individual subjective assessments of aggregate 
market demand imply that subjective equilibrium yields the same behavior as 
Cournot predicts. 
The literature on learning in strategic interaction has exploded over the last 
few years. It includes too large a number of bounded and myopic models to list 
here, as well as ·a large number of rational learning papers. A very partial sample of 
recent related rational-learning models includes Crawford and Heller (1990), 
Monderer and Samet (1990), Nyarko (199lb), Vives (1992), Koutsougeras and 
Yannelis (1993), Goyal and Janssen (1993), and Fujiwara-Grew (1993). Blume and 
Easley (1992) and Jordan (1993) present excellent critical evaluations of this 
approach. Also, a growing literature on strategic rational learning concentrating on 
reputation and forgiveness aspects is emerging--see, for example, Cripps and Thomas 
(1991), Schmidt (1991), and Watson (1992). These directions are especially 
important since forgiving strategies invite experimentation, a phenomenon that may 
create a coincidence of subjective with objective equilibria .  
The present paper is also a direct contribution to the literature on players 
who do not know their own utility functions, as in the case-based approach of Gilboa 
and Schmeidler (1992). We discuss this after we study the multi-arm bandit 
example. 
Two interesting connections to explore are with subjective variants of the 
Mertens and Zamir (1985) hierarchies of rationality model, as in Nyarko (1991a) 
and El-Gama] (1992), and with a new literature on endogenous uncertainty in 
economics, as in Chichilinksy (1992) and Kurz (1994). It seems that there should be 
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close relationships between subjective optimization and equilibria to these other new 
directions. 
A forthcoming paper, Part II, will study additional properties of subjective
equilibria. Among other issues, it will study: (a) general conditions under which 
subjective and objective equilibria coincide, and (b) the effect of the discount factor 
on experimentation with forgiving strategies. 
2. Examples and Intuition
It is obvious that a subjective equilibrium may give rise to drastically different
outcomes than objective equilibrium. Even the well known repeated prisoners' 
dilemma game with myopic players may be "solved." For example, if each player 
believes that whenever he acts non-cooperatively he will be severely punished by an 
outside force, h is  best response is  to repeatedly act cooperatively. Thus, the two 
players play the fully cooperative path as a response to their beliefs. Moreover, their 
beliefs are not contradicted, since neither ever acts non-cooperatively to find out 
that his fear of severe punishment was not founded . .  
Before we turn, however, to  additional multi-person examples with less 
"dramatic" beliefs, we start with the well known one person multi-arm bandit 
problem (see Wittle (1982) for the general problem, and see Rothschild (1974), and 
Banks and Sundanam (1993) for more recent references and economic applications). 
It turns out to be a special, stationary case, of our general formulation. The need to 
distinguish between subjective and objective equilibria becomes very clear here. 
Example 2.1 (A Two-arm Bandit Game): The player in each period t = 1 ,  2, . . .  , has 
to engage in one of two possible activities, L and R. (A special case where these 
activities represent handles of two different slot machines motivates the name of this 
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problem.) Each activity, Land R, has a stationary payoff distribution, IlL and IlR' 
describing independent probabilities of realized payoffs when the corresponding 
activity is used. The player's goal is to maximize the expected present value of his 
total payoff, discounted by some fixed parameter. Clearly, the optimal objective 
solution is to repeatedly use the activity with the higher per-play expected value. 
What makes the problem interesting is that the player may not know Ilv IlR, 
or both. Instead, as be plays be observes payoffs generated by these distributions 
according to the actions that he uses. So every time he chooses to use L he sees the 
resulting payoff generated by Ilv and the same for R. But in every period, before
making his· choice, be knows the full history of his past choices and resulting payoffs. 
In order to maximize his expected payoff, depending on bis discount parameter and 
subjective beliefs, it may pay him to experiment with both activities in order to learn 
something about their payoff distribution. Clearly, higher discount factors, 
representing more patient players in our conventions, lead to more experimentation, 
even if some immediate payoffs may seem to be sacrificed. But the problem is 
difficult and the question of bow much and bow to experiment depends in a fairly 
complex way on the subjective beliefs. These are described by prior probability 
distributions on sets of possible payoff distributions associated with each activity. 
Suppose, for �ur example, that activity L generates payoffs of $0 or $2 with 
equal probabilities, i.e., IlL (0) = IlL (2) = .5 .  Let's also assume that the player 
knows that. On the other hand, he does not know IlR and assigns positive
probabilities i.. G and i.. B (i.. G + i.. B = 1)  to it being one of two possible distributions
w and TI8. The "good" distribution n° has nG (2) = .6 and TIG (0) = .4, but the
"bad" distribution has IlB (2) = .4 and IlB (0) = . 6. The following scenarios give rise
to equilibria , or lack of such, of different types. 
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Scenario 1: IJR = IJ
B, l.B is very high, and the player chooses to play repeatedly
activity L. This is an objectively optimal strategy, since he  chooses the optimal
strategy against the true payoff distributions of the two machines. It is also 
subjectively optimal since, for sufficiently high l B, the best response is not to
experiment and to just use activity L. Notice also that the beliefs of the players will 
remain the same throughout the play, since the only uncertainty is regarding IlR but 
R is never used. In particular, the belief-confirmation property is satisfied. That is, 
given his strategy, his assessment of probabilities of his actual future payoffs is 
accurate. So hiS strategy with beliefs constitute also a subjective equilibrium.  This is 
despite the fact that his conjectures, regarding hypothetical payoffs under different 
strategies, are not accurate. 
Scenario 2: As before, A. B is very high and the· player uses repeatedly activity L, but
now the real payoff distribution 11R = TI°. The player is best responding to his
subjective beliefs, described by the high value of A. B. Moreover, since he always uses
activity L, he will never find out that his beliefs are very far from the truth. In this 
scenario we are at a subjective equilibrium, which is not an objective equilibrium. If 
the player knew that 11R = II° be would not want to stay with the constant left
strategy. 
Scenario 3: A. G is high, the player uses repeatedly activity R, but 11R = TI
B. This is
obviously not an objectively optimal solution. But also subjective equilibrium fails. 
While the player maximizes initially against bis beliefs, with increasingly high 
probability he will find out that bis subjective beliefs are wrong, i .e., his posterior 
beliefs on TIB will converge to l, and as a consequence would not stay with the
repeated use of activity R. In particular, belief-confirmation is violated here. The 
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belief that l G is high, together with the choice of always playing R, leads the player
to optimistic assessment regarding his realized future payoffs. However, in the 
language of Van Huyck, his expectations will not be "born out by the facts" as he 
keeps playing R. 
The previous example with the three scenarios illustrates the relationships of 
the different equilibria. Every objective equilibrium is a subjective one, when the 
subjective assessments happen to coincide with the true distributions. Because then, 
subjective and objective optimization are the same and belief confirmation is 
unavoidable. However, when the subjective assessments are not accurate, as in 
scenario 2", we may have a discrepancy. Thus, the set of subjective equilibria is really
larger. But, as scenario 3 illustrates, not all strategies and beliefs constitute 
subjective equilibria. 
In scenario 2 above, the discrepancy betWeen subjective and objective 
equilibria is due to the fact that the player does not ''know the game" he is playing. 
In this example, he does not know the payoff rules. When we move to multi-player 
situations, different types of information imperfections may cause such discrepancies. 
In the next example, even though both players fully know the game, imperfect 
monitoring of each other's actions brings about equilibria which are subjective but 
not objective. We refer the reader to Fudenberg and Kreps ( 1988) and Fudenberg 
and Levine ( 1993) for similar earlier examples. 
Example 2.2 (Acting in the Dark): This symmetric 2-person game has two actions 
for each player: r for rest and a for act. 
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r a 
r 0, 0 0, 1 
a 1 ,  0 -1 , -1 
A player choosing r is paid 0 regardless of his opponent choice. A player that 
chooses a, on the other hand, is paid 1 if his opponent chooses r, but -1 if his 
opponent chooses a too. 
We assume that the two players choose their actions repeatedly and 
simultaneously in the beginning of periods t = 1, 2, . . . . However, in each period, 
after the choices are made, each is only told his payoff, and is not told his 
opponent's choice. This means that, when he chooses to rest, he learns nothing 
about  his opponent's choice. But when he chooses to act he learns, indirectly 
through his payoff, his opponent's choice. 
We also assume that the players know all the information given above, i.e. , 
they have common knowledge of the game. The only uncertainty each faces is 
regarding his opponent strategy. 
Let A be the constant strategy of acting in each period and R be the constant 
rest strategy. It is easy to see that (A, R) and (R, A) are objective Nash equilibria 
of the repeated game with imperfect monitoring. These are equilibria because the 
best reply to A is R and vice versa. 
What about (R, R)? The first player may be playing R because he thinks that 
player two is playing A. With the imperfect monitoring he never finds out that he is 
wrong and playing R against the conjecture that the other is playing A is as justified 
as playing R when the other player really plays A. So again we have a situation 
where each player chooses a strategy, R in this case, which is a best response to his
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conjecture, that his opponent plays A, and what he obsexves does not contradict his 
conjectures. In other words (R, R) is a subjective equilibrium, even though it is not 
an objective Nash equilibrium. 
Our next example is of a two player game. It illustrates several important 
items. First, moving to correlation, it shows a subjective correlated equilibrium 
which is not an objective correlated equilibrium of the same game. Second, it 
illustrates the process of learning and converging, in one step here, to the subjective 
correlated equilibrium. Finally, it illustrates the generality of a class of games we 
allow in our model. In particular, our stage game can be viewed as a m.u lti-person,
multi-arm ·bandit problem. 
Example 2.3 (Winners and Losers Acting in the Dark): As in the previous example
we consider a two player game with each having· to repeatedly choose between 
resting (r) or acting (a), and each being informed only about his resulting payoffs. 
Again, a player that rests receives a zero payoff and a player that acts, at a period 
where his opponent rests, receives a payoff of 1 .  The above information is known to 
both players. However, now when both players act, a random pair of payoffs will be 
generated according to a fixed probability distribution I1a,a·
r a 
r 0, 0 0, 1 
a 1 ,  0 Ila.a
We consider different scenarios that may arise depending on the beliefs and actual 
payoff when both players choose to act. 
We first restrict ourselves to the case where I1a a can take on only two
' 
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possible values: Ila,a = IIW,L or Ila,a = IIL, w, defined as follows.
IIW,L (10, - 1) = .99 and rrw,L (-1 , 10) = .01. In other words, under IIW,L player 2
is most likely to lose while player 1 is most likely to greatly enjoy "winning" the 
conflict with player 2. SymmetricaUy, we define IIL, W (10, -1) = .01 and
rrL. w < -1 ,  10) = .99.
Scenario 1 :  A standard common knowledge game. Nature moves first and chooses 
randomly with equal probability Ila.a to equal IlW,L or IlL, w. The realized choice,
which is to be fixed now for the duration of the infinite game, is not revealed to the 
players. However, fo1lowing standard game theoretic analysis, we assume that a ll the 
information above is common knowledge. 
If the players are sufficiently patient, then each would want to learn if he is a 
"frequent winner" or a "frequent loser" in order to continue playing the game 
optimally. A reasonable Nash equilibrium of this Bayesian game has each player 
experimenting by acting at the first stage. If he loses he stops acting forever, but if 
he wins 1 or !O's he acts again. (After a while the computation of equilibrium 
becomes more complicated, since every time that he receives a 10 or a -1 he can 
update his prior as to the underlying Ila.a being TIW,
L or TIL,W. Like the one-arm
bandit problem, this is a relatively simple analysis. Once a player decides to rest at 
some stage he receives no new information. Assuming therefore a "once-rest, rest­
forever" strategy, facilitates the computation of relatively simple equilibrium. We 
choose not to complete this computation here, since it is tangential to the points we 
wish to make.) 
Scenario 2: Where both players are wrong and learn in one step to play a subjective 
correlated equilibrium which is not objective. Suppose the players believe everything 
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as in Scenario 1 and, therefore, choose Nash equilibrium strategies of the type 
described there. But assume that they are both wrong in that the payoff distribution 
of both acting, fia,a' is really the random distribution ITR, defined as follows.
ITR (10, - 1) = l1R (-1 ,  10) = l1R (-1,  -1) = 1/3. In other words, in each period when
they both act it is equally likely, independently of the past, that one would lose, the 
other will win a lot, but also that they both lose. 
Since both players choose to act in the first period, they will be paid according 
to a random draw of l1R· Therefore, there are three possible developments from
period two on. With 1/3 probability, the first draw is a (10, -1). Following this they 
will each ·assign high subjective probability to I1a,a = l1W,L, and will continue playing
the constant strategies (A, R). Similarly, with 1/3 probability they will be paid 
(-1,  10), assign high probability to I1L, w, and play (R, A). But also with 1/3
probability they will draw (-1 ,  -1) in the first period. This will lead each player to 
assign high probability to the distribution in which he is a loser and as a result the 
pair of constant strategies (R, R) will be played. 
So if we consider the game, starting from period two on, we have a correlated 
strategy, assigning probabilities 1/3 to (R, A), to (A, R) and to (R, R). 
Correspondingly, we have correlated beliefs where, with probability of 1/3 each, the 
players respectively assign high subjective likelihoods to the payoff distribution being 
(I1L, w, ITL, w), (I1W,L, ITW,L) and (I1L, w, ITW,L). This is a subjective correlated
equilibrium, since after each period 1 outcome, the correlated strategies are best 
response to the correlated beliefs and the induced subjective distributions on the 
future play of the game coincide with the objective one. 
Consider, for example, the initial message to be the draw (-1 ,  -1) .  Now each 
player believes that he has encountered an acting opponent in the first period. 
Moreover, given that he lost (he does not, of course, even consider the possibility 
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that his opponent lost too) his updated posterior beliefs are that he i s  very likely a
frequent loser and he decides to stay out forever. Since both stay out forever, their 
beliefs regarding their future payoffs in the game are accurate. 
Since the actual expected payoffs of the action vector (a, a) are (2.66, 2.66),
the correlated strategies 1/3 on (A, R), 1/3 on (R, A) and 1/3 (R, R) are not a 
correlated equilibrium of the real repeated game. 
3. Subjective Equilibrium of a Single Decision Maker
We consider a player with a nonempty finite set of actions A, a countable set
of outcomes (consequences) C, and bounded a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function u :  A x C � R.
Dynamically, the player will choose actions a1,a2, . . .  from A. In every period t,
after he chooses the action at, an outcome ct e C will be  stochastically determined,
reported to him, and he will collect the payoff u (at,ct) .  The player's objective is to 
maximize the present value of his expected utility discounted by a fixed parameter l,
0<.A.< l. 
The above formulation implicitly assumes that the player knows A, C, u and 
.A.. What he does not know is the stochastic rule by which outcomes are generated. 
Examples of such problems are numerous. We will analyze the multi-arm 
bandit problem, where A represents a set of possible "arms" or activities to use, 
c E C represents a stochastically generated payoff, and u(a,c) = c. The stochastic
choice of the outcome c in this example will be stationary and its distribution will 
depend entirely on the chosen a .  
A more complex economic example concerns a producer in an oligopoly 
whose action at in each period t describes a chosen production level. Here, an 
outcome ct describes his resulting market price. The stochastic determination of ct 
���
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is a function of bis production level at, the production choices of his competitors,
and a demand function which depends on the joint production vector plus a random 
noise. Here we will not assume stationary determination of outcomes (prices) since 
the competitors are likely to change their production levels as they too observe the 
behavior of the market. 
In the general formulation, the determination of outcomes is �escribed by a 
stochastic environment response function denoted by e.· For every histozy of actions. 
and outcomes, ht = (a1,c1, . . .  ,at,ct), and for any t + 1 period action at+l, e defines a
probabiHty distribution over C. Formally, elh11,.1(c) denotes the probability that the
outcome ·C �II be chosen after the play consisting of the history ht followed by the
action at+l. Thus the above values must be nonnegative and sum to 1 over the
possible values of c for any fixed ht and at+l. The unique  empty history ho is
allowed and thus e 1h011 describes the distribution of initial outcomes as a function of
every chosen initial action a1 . (When it does not create confusion, to simplify
notation we will omit some time-superscripts, e.g., write e I ha(c)).
If the player knows the environment response. function e, his problem is to 
choose a (behavior) strategy f to maximize the present value of h is expected payoff 
computed with the distribution generated by bis strategy and e. Formally such a 
strategy f assigns a probability distribution over the action set A for every history of
past actions and outcomes. Thus, f lhi(a )  represents the probability that action a will
be chosen in period t + 1 if the player observed the history ht. Fixing ht, flhi(a) must
sum to one as we vary a E A. 
We choose not to restrict our analysis to pure strategies, where each f lh' 
assigns probability one to a single a E A. Such a restriction, even if not significant
for the one player case, would limit the scope of the analysis in the sections that 
follow. 
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To consider the expected present value of utility. resulting from a strategy f, 
we first must describe the underlying probability space. It consists of a set Z of
infinite play paths of the form z = (a1,c1,a2,c2, ... ). For a history h1, as described
above, we will abuse notation and let is also denote the cylinder set in Z, consisting
of all infmite play paths z whose initial t,....period segment coincides with ht. As 
usual, the a-algebra used for Z is the one generated by all cylinder sets ht and to
specify a probability on Z it suffices to assign consistent probabilities to all hhs.·
We do this inductively in the usual way. Given a strategy f and an 
environment reaction function e, we define µf e(h
o) = 1 .  For ht+l described by ht, 
followed ·by· at+l ct+l we define µ (ht+l) = (h t\f l ( t+l) I ( t+l) ' , f,e µf,e J h 1 a e hta••• c ·
Now we can define utility functions for strategies. First, the u tility assigned to 
a play path z = (a1 ,c1 ,a2,c2, . . .  ) is computed by u (z) = E 1.t-lu(at,ct) . The utility of
a strategy f and an environment reaction function e is computed to be u(f,e) = 
f u(z)dµf,e(z).
As stated earlier, the player's objective is to choose f that maximizes u(f,e).
However, since we assume that the player does not know e, he cannot solve the 
above problem. 
Taking a subjective approach, we assume that the player holds an 
endogenously given subjective belief about the environment reaction function, e, and 
that he chooses f to maximize u(f,e). But we do not assume that e coincides with e.
When this is the case we say that f is  subjectively optimal relative to e. If f is 
optimal relative to the "real" e we say that it is objectively optimal or just optimal. 
Remark 3.1 
A. Beliefs Over a Set of Possible Environments. While in the above
formulation the player's subjective belief is restricted to be a single environment 
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reaction function it is really more general. For example, if the player assigned prior 
probabilities q1,q2, . . .  ,q0 to a set of possible environment reaction functions e1, . . .  ,e0,
he could replace this belief system by a single equivalent belief function e. This is 
done using the usual Bayes updating construction as, for example, in Kuhn's (1953) 
theorem. After every history ht one computes posterior probabilities ch, ... ,q0 for the
environments e1, ... ,e0 and assign probabilities to the next outcome according to the 
ei's weighted with the updated posteriors. We do such a construction in our
example of a multi-arm bandit problem discussed later. 
B. Imperfect Updating of Environmental Reactions. Updating posterior 
beliefs, as described above, assumes a type of consistency and perfect rationality on 
the beliefs of the player. However, the abstract formulation described by a single e, 
which is a function that can be freely defined after every history, allows for more 
general and imperfect updating. For example; a· player with Bayesian posterior
probabilities, q1, . . .  ,q0, can adjust some up and some down if he choose to put less 
weight than the correct one on small probability posteriors. 
The discrepancy between the real environment response function, e, and the 
subjective one, e, may make the player alert to the fact that his assessment is wrong. 
Given his choice of strategy f, his assessment of the stochastic evolution of his future 
outcomes is given by µ _ while the real evolution follows the distribution µf e· If, f,e' , 
however, µ _ = µ then it is impossible for him to detect, even with sophisticated f,e f,e 
statistical tests, that he is wrong. This is despite the fact that serious discrepancies 
may exist between e and e. These discrepancies, however, are non-observable under
his chosen strategy. With such discrepancies, even if f is subjectively optimal it may 
be objectively suboptimal but the player could not determine that, and will have no 
cause to change his assessment or his strategy. This gives rise to the following 
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definition. 
Definition 3.1: The strategy f with the environment reaction function e is a 
subjective equilibrium relative to the belief e if the following two conditions hold. 
1 . Subjective-Optimization: f maximizes u(f,e), and
2. Belief-Confirmation: µr.e = µr.e·
Remark 3.2 (Optimizing Implies Experimenting): Reflecting on the definition 
above, a subjective equilibrium can be suboptimal because, and only because, its 
assessment of outcome probabilities off the equilibrium play path is wrong. An 
obvious remedy to such a deficiency is for the player to experiment, in order to learn 
to the greatest extent possible, the off-path outeome probabilities. When and how 
much to experiment are difficult questions. While under-experimentation may be . 
suboptimal, over-experimentation may also be so. Computing the optimal level of 
experimentation requires knowledge of real distributions, which the player does not 
possess. However, under the subjective approach , it is naturally incorporated into 
bis subjective optimization problem. 
Consider, for example, a two-arm bandit player, with two competing activities, .  
L and R ,  of Example 2. 1 .  Suppose each activity has a stationary payoff distribution 
IlL and IIR. Assume for simplicity, as we did there, that the subjective beliefs are 
accurate on left, fIL = IIv with expected utility of 1 for every use of L. On the
other band, for R, the player believes that there are the two distributions nB and
n°, one of which was drawn initially with probabilities .90 and . 1 0, respectively.
Recall that the corresponding expected values are 0.8 and 1 .2. By the law of large 
numbers, sufficiently long use of R will reveal to the player whether nG or n8 was
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drawn. Depending on his discount parameter, his subjective optimization will 
determine the optimal experimentation strategy. If the future is important enough, 
the ten percent chance that eventual generation of a payoff stream with expected 
value of 1 .2 in each period will dictate an initial experimentation period. But if 
future payoffs are sufficiently unimportant, it would be subjectively suboptimal to 
experiment. 
The optimal strategy in the definition of subjective equilibrium above a lready.
includes a subjectively optimal level of experimentation. The. actual computation of 
such optimal strategies is done using the well known Gittins index, see Wittie (1982). 
We will see in the sequel that under a certain condition, relating the belief to 
the truth, a subjective optimizer must converge eventually to a subjective 
equilibrium. In any finite time, however, he may converge only to an E-subjective
equilibrium where the subjective distribution, µ -, is only close to the objective one,
�- �e 
µf,e· To make this precise we must first discuss notions of closeness of distributions.
Definition 3.2: For a given E > 0 and two probability distributions, µ and µ, we say 
that µ is e-close to µ if for any event A, I µ(A) - jl(A) I S E.
Remark 3.3: Interpretations of Closeness of Distributions. We say that µ is E-near 
to µ if there is an event Q, with µ(Q) and iJ,(Q) � 1 - E, satisfying I 1 - µ(A)/il(A) I 
s E for every event A � Q (we assume in the above that 0/0 = 1) .
As was shown in Kalai and Lehrer ( 1993c), the two notions, E-closeness and
€-nearness are asymptotically equivalent, i .e . ,  by making the distributions 
sufficiently close in one sense, we can force them to be as close as we wish in the 
other sense. Thus, limit results, where we obtain eventual arbitrary closeness of two 
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measures, are the same in both senses. 
While the notion of e-closeness is easier to state, the notion of e-nearness is 
more revealing. First notice that e-closeness says little on small probability events. 
For example, we can have ii(A) = 2µ(A) and still have ii be e-close to µ provided 
that µ(A) < e/2. On the other hand, e-nearness shows that this can be the case but 
not on events A � Q. Within the large set Q the ratios of the probabilities must be
close to 1 .  This has important implications for conditional probabilities, which take 
on special importance in models with infinite horizons. 
Recall that our discussion of closeness of the measures µ and µ is motivated
to capture· the idea that a player believing µ but observing events generated by µ. is
not likely to suspect that µ is wrong. The notion of e-closeness captures this idea for
large events .  Our player, however, after a long play is likely to observe small 
probability events consisting of long chains of events. His forecast of future events 
then will be obtained by assigning probability to future events conditional on having 
observed low probability events. Thus, if our notion of closeness of µ. and µ are
such that the conditional probabilities they generate remain close, then the player 
using µ. is not likely to suspect his µ. even in the far future.
e-nearness, and thus its asymptotically equivalent notion of E-closeness, fulfills 
this property to a large extent. Since 
µ(AIB ) =
jl(AjB ) 
µ(A and B )  jl(B) 
jl(A and B )  µ(B )'
we can deduce that if A and B are events in Q, no matter how small, then closeness
to 1 of the two factors in the right side implies closeness of the conditional 
probabilities in the left side. 
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Definition 3.3: Given E > 0, a strategy f, and environments e and e, we say that f is 




Subjective Optimization: f maximizes u(f,e), and 
E-Belief-Confirmation: µ _ is E-close to µf e· f,e • 
Convergence of a subjectively optimal strategy to a subjective equilibrium is . 
not guaranteed in general but is true under sufficient conditions of compatibility of 
the beliefs with the truth. The relationships between notions of compatibility, 
notions of convergence, and alternative notions of E-subjective equilibrium, involve
detailed mathematical analysis. To proceed with the presentation of the subjective 
approach, we present one such notion of compatibility that works well with our 
notion of E-closeness (or E-nearness) as defined above. For alternative concepts we 
refer the reader to Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1993). 
Definition 3.4: We say that the subjective evolution .described by (f,e) is compatible 
with the one generated by (f,e) if the distribution µf,e is absolutely continuous with
respect to µ ., µ _ > µ . This means that for every event A, f,e f,e f,e 
In other words, events considered impossible according to the subjective belief of the 
agent, i .e. , having subjective probability zero, are really impossible, i .e. , they have 
objective zero probability. 
Our goal is to show that after a sufficiently long time T, a subjective optimizer 
will play essentially an E-subjective equilibrium for arbitrarily small E. To make this 
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formal we need to describe the environment response functions and strategies 
induced on the "new" problem starting from time T on. 
Definition 3.5:  Let e be an environment response function, f a  strategy, and h a 
history of length t. Define the environment response function eh and the strategy fh 
induced by h by 
Cii lb.Cc) = e lliha(c) and
fh h;(a) = f l!ih(a).
The notation hii used above denotes the concatenation of the histories h and ii, i.e., 
the history whose length is the sum of the lengths of h and ii obtained by starting 
with the elements of h and continuing with the· e.lements of ii. 
Theorem 3. 1 :  Let f be a subjectively optimal strategy relative toe in the 
environment e, and assume that (f,e) is compatible with (f,e). For every E > 0 there 
is a time T such that with probability greater than 1 - E, fh is an €-subjective 
equilibrium in the environment eh relative to the beliefs eh for every history h with 
length greater than T. 
The probability 1 - E in the statement of the theorem is the objective one, 
computed by µf,e· 
The proof of the theorem follows immediately from the seminal "merging of 
opinions" theorem in Blackwell and Dubins (1962) (see also Kalai and Lehrer 
(1993c) for extensions and alternative statements). 
Example 3. 1 .  The Multi-arm Bandit Problem 
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In the general formulation, we think of A as any finite set of activities that 
can be used repeatedly in periods t = 1 ,2, . . . . A countable set of outcomes C
consists of real numbers representing possible payoffs. For each activity a E A
there is a fixed probability distribution Ila over C with Ila(c) describing the (past
independent) probability of the outcome c being realized when the action a is taken. 
The player's goal is to choose a sequence of actions a 1 ,a2 , ... , with each at E A, that
will maximize the present value of his expected payoff. However, he does not know 
the distributions, Ila's, and whenever he uses the action a1 at time t, he is told his
realized payoff, 'which was drawn according to n. 1• Naturally, he can use this and all
previous - information before making his next choice, at+l .
In our general formulation, this example is modeled with A and C being 
described as above, u(a,c) = c, and a stationary environment function 
e l ha(c) = Ila(c). Our player, not knowing the · functions Il but knowing the
stationary structure of the model, assumes that for every a, the distribution Ila was
chosen from among m possible distributions n!, . . . ,Il� with positive prior probabilities
A!, . . . ,A �· We assume that Ila indeed equals n! for some j .
The subjective environment response function, e, is computed by the standard 
method of Bayesian updating. First we compute inductively posterior probabilities 
A! I h' j = l, . . .  ,m, for every a and h. Initially, A.! Ibo = A.!. And for a history. of the
form h obtained by concatenating a history h with an action outcome pair (a,c) 
i..! h; = A! lb if a ;t a, and J.! lh = J.� lb Il�(c)/[:Ei A� lh II�(c)J if a =  a . Then e is
defined by e l h,a(c) = Ei A! l h n!(c). 
Since we assumed above that Ila is assigned positive prior probability, for 
every strategy f, (f,e) is compatible with (f,e). Thus by Theorem 3. 1 for every E > 0 
we can find a large enough time T such that with probability of at least 1 - E the
strategy and beliefs of the player from time T on constitute an €-subjective 
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equilibrium. 
Corollaiy 3.1: Suppose that the activities are strictly ranked by expected value, i .e . , 
distinct objective expected values are generated by distinct activities, then for every 
e > 0 there is a time t such that with probability greater than 1 - e the subjectively 
optimizing player desc.ribed above will use only one activity from time t on. 
Proof: We may assume without loss of generality that a is pure. (If a is a 
subjectively optimal behavior strategy, we take a look at any pure strategy in the 
support ofa.) We show that with probability 1 there is a (random) time t from 
which on a prescribes playing one arm only. This certainly implies the corollary. 
Assume to the contrary that there exists an event, R, with positive probability 
such that on every infinite history h E R there are infinitely many truncations of 
h,h1, after which a uses at least two arms. We denote by ah , the continuation of a
after the finite history ht. 
From Theorem 3.1 ,  we deduce that on almost every h E R, ah 1 is a 
St-subjective equilibrium, where St --. 0. We take one h E R and consider the
sequence of times t such that ah 1 prescribes the arm a1 first and ah1•1 prescribes the 
arm a2 ( a1 ;e a2) first. We proceed by the following lemma to the contradiction. 
Lemma 1 :  Let at be a Scsubjective equilibrium, where St --. 0, then any limit of
at(t --. oo) is a subjective equilibrium.
Proof: Clearly, every limit of at is optimal against the limit of the corresponding
beliefs and moreover, confirms this limit belief. II 
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Lemma 2: If u is a subjective equilibrium in the set -up of Corollary 3 .1 ,  it uses only 
one arm, with probability 1 .  
Proof: Let A' be the set of those arms used with a positive probability under u. 
Since u is subjectively optimal in the grand game (with the full set of arms, A),. it is 
also subjectively optimal in the reduced game (with A' only). As u is subjective 
equilibrium with A it is an objective equilibrium with A' (simply because there is a 
full knowledge about the expected payoffs of all the arms available, A'). 
However, as an objective equilibrium, u should prescribe using only one arm, 
the best one. II 
Returning to the proof of the corollary, recall that a is pure, that ah , 
prescribes the arm a1 and that 0h1•1 prescribes the arm a2. Denote by w
t+ l  the
outcome that forms with the history h1, the longer history, ht+ l. (I.e., ht+ l  is the
concatenation of ht and w1+
1
.) Since there exist only finitely many wt+ l  and
infinitely many t, we may assume that all the wt+l are the same. As the probability
to get wt+ l  by using the arm a1 is stationary, say, p > 0, we deduce that ah ' 
prescribes using the arm a2 at the second stage with probability p. Therefore, any 
limit of at' a, assigns to two arms a1 and to a2 positive probabilities. By Lemma 1 ,  a
is a subjective equilibrium which contradicts Lemma 2. // 
Remark 3.4 (Players who do not know their own utilities) : Learning one's own 
utility function is an important problem in decision theory--see, for example, Gilboa 
and Schmeidler ( 1992) for a new approach and recent references. It deals with a 
player that can choose repeatedly activities a from a set A but does not know his 
own utility function u(a). Our general formulation assumes that the player has a 
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known utility function, u(a,c), defined on actions and their consequence. However, 
it includes the case of not knowing a function u( a) as a special case. To illustrate 
this point, observe that not knowing your own utility can be viewed as a special case 
of the multi-arm bandit problem with the set C representing numerical payoffs, and 
the unknown ll3(c) assigning probability one to c = u(a). 
4. Multi-Person Subjective Equilibria 
4.1 The Repeated Stochastic-Outcome Game 
We now assume that there are n-players, n =::::: 1 ,  each having a finite set of 
actions �-, a countable set of outcomes Ci, a utility function ui: Ai x Ci -+ R, and a 
discount parameter i..i. Also, as before, each players knows his individual data 
above, and would like to choose a sequence of actions, a 1 ,a2 , . . .  , to maximize the
present value of his expected utility. But, again,' he does not know the rule of how 
his actions affect his outcomes, i .e., his environment response function. 
Taking the approach of the previous section, we could assume that each 
individual starts with a subjective belief about his environment, described by an ei,
chooses an optimal strategy fi relative to ei, and conclude that eventually each player 
will play a subjective equilibrium. However, we are now interested in the long term 
interactive equilibrium behavior of the players, and for that purpose we must first be 
more explicit about how the actions of one player enter the environment function of 
another. 
We describe these cross affects by a collection of probability distributions, Ila, 
defined for every action vector a E A =  x i  Ai. More precisely, lla(c) denotes the 
probability that the outcome vector c E C = x i  Ci be realized if the vector of 
actions a is taken. Thus, for a fixed i, the above quantities must sum to 1 as we vary 
c. Notice that the distributions Ila, together with the action sets Ai and the utility
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function ui fully determine an n -person stage game, G. In this game, for every
action vector a, player i's (expected) utility is computed to be u i(a) = Ee 
ui(ai,ci)II3(c). We refer to such a game as a stochastic-outcome game.
The above game will be played repeatedly as follows. In every period 
t = 1,2, ... each player, being informed of his past actions and realized outcomes, will 
choose action af E �- Then, based on the vector of choices, at, nature will choose a
vector of outcomes ct E C according to the distribution Ila· Player i will be
informed of his own outcome, cf, will collect the payoff ui(af ,cf), and will proceed to
choose af + 1, arid so on. Overall individual payoffs will be computed to be the
present value of the total expected utility discounted by the individual discount 
parameters, i.. i. We denote the infinitely repeated game described above by G
00•
Example 4.1 .1 : A Cournot Game with Differentiated Products. We assume that 
each of the n players is a producer of a certain good; with Ai denoting the set of his 
possible period production levels. Now Ci describes a set of period m arket prices 
producer i may realize. Thus, for every vector of production levels a E A, II3(p) 
describes the probability of the vector of individual prices p = (p1 , . . .  ,p0) being
realized. The u tility of player i is defined as usual by his resulting revenue minus 
cost, a ip i - gi(ai), with gi denoting his production cost function. Thus, in each 
period the player knows his previous production levels and prices, and based on this 
knowledge he chooses his next production level. 
When all producers produce a homogeneous product, and face the same 
market price, we model the situation by restricting the support of each Ila to p's with
P1 = P2 = · · ·  = Pn· 
Remark 4.1 .1 : Imperfect Versus Perfect Monitoring. While our general 
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formulation, with each player being informed only of his own realized actions and 
outcomes, describes imperfect monitoring and other types of information 
imperfection, it includes as special cases games with more monitoring and common 
information. For example, perfect monitoring in the Cournot example above could 
be specified by letting each player's reported outcome, ci = (a1, . . .  ,an,Pi)· So the
outcome reported to player i includes a ll the production levels but only his realized 
price. Full common knowledge of histories can be modeled by letting individually 
reported outcomes include all production levels and all realized prices, i .e. , ci = ( a1 , . . .  ,an, p1, . . .  ,pr
Regardless of how the ci's and 11 are defined, however, under the convention
that a player knows all his previous realized actions and outcomes before choosing 
his next action, our games always have perfect recall in Kuhn's (1953) sense. 
Our general subjective approach will assume that there is a real "objective 
game," G00 as defined above, being played. We will depart, however, from the 
traditional game theory assumption that the players know the game. Instead we will 
define the notion of a subjective game to include the objective game and the beliefs 
of the individual players. Such subjective beliefs will be modeled by subjective 
environment response functions as defined in the previous section. It will ease the 
exposition, however, if we first review and establish the notations needed for the 
objective notions of Nash and correlated equ ilibria. 
Formally, we define a h istory of length t, ht, to consist of a vector
(a 1 ,c1 , . . .  ,at ,ct) where each aj E A and ct E C. An individual player history 
hj = (a} ,c} , . . .  ,af,cj) with each a1E Ai and c1 E Ci. A play path z = (a1,cl ,a2, c2, . . . )
and it induces finite histories h1 and finite individual histories hf by taking
projections to the first t elements and then taking projections to the i- th 
component. 
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A strategy of player i is a function fi describing the probability that he takes a 
specified action after a specific history. Formally, f. lh (a.) denotes the probabilityI I I . 
that he would choose action ai after observing his individual h istory hi. 
Following standard game theory, one defines the utility function ui(f) for 
every strategy vector f = (f1 , . . . ,fn), and a Nash equilibrium to be a vector f* with
each f; maximizing ui(f:i,fi)· (Here and elsewhere, f_i denotes a vector of
strategies of all players but i where (f: i ,fi) denotes the vector where a ll players but i
play their star strategy but i plays fi.) To define the (expected) utility functions one 
needs to first establish the probability space describing the possible plays of the 
game. 
We let Z denote the set of (infinite) play paths, and as before we let h1 
denote a history of a finite length t but also the cylinder set defined by it. Given a 
strategy vector f we define the probability distribution it induces on finite histories, 
µf, inductively. For the empty history µf{ho) = 1, and assuming that µf was defined 
for all histories of length t, we define it for histories h of length t + 1 by 
Since the above construction defines consistent probabilities for all cylinder sets it 
defines the distribution µf on the set of play paths. 
Now for every play path z = (a 1 ,c1,a2,c2, ... ) we define u i (z) = L1 Af-lui(a},c})
and for a vector of strategies f we define u i(f) = f u i(z)dµf{z). 
Often the strategies of the players in the repeated game are correlated since 
their choice depends on correlated past individual messages. Formally, such a 
correlation device is described by two components. First is a nonempty countable 
set of message vectors, M = x i  Mi, with each Mi denoting the set of player i's 
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messages. The second component is a probability distribution p defined on M. 
A vector of correlated strategies, f = (f1 , . . . ,fn) for the game G
00, is defined by
amending a correlation device to the beginning of the game. This is done by 
replacing the unique· empty history by all possible elements m E M and allowing a 
player's strategy to depend on his reported initial message mi. Formally, a history of
"length zero" is now any element of M, history of length t is of the form 
( 1 1 
t t) d l h - ( 1 1 2 2 ) I d . .  d l h . . m,a ,c , . . . ,a ,c an a p ay pat z - m,a ,c ,a ,c ,... . n 1vt ua 1stones are 
described as before by projecting to the player's component. So an individual 
history of player i is a vector of the form (mi,a} ,c} , . . .  ,af ,cf). Now a vector of
correlated · strategies f = (f1, . . . ,fn) has each fi describe a distribution over player i's
actions for every individual history with an initial individual message. In other 
words, it is a vector of standard behavior strategies for the game with the initial 
correlation device, the correlated game, (M,P,G00) .
The utility of player i is computed as before to be his expected present value 
where the probability distribution on the expanded Z includes the initial distribution 
p. Thus we only need to modify the distribution over length zero histories by
defining µf{m) = p(m). The probability of longer histories are defined inductively as 
before. 
A vector of correlated strategies, f, is a correlated equil ibrium of G00 if it is a
Nash equilibrium of the correlated game (M,p,G00) as defined above, for some 
correlation device (M,p). 
As in the previous section, we will be interested in the play of the repeated 
game starting after a long time T. In the "new" game correlation cannot be ruled
out since each player strategy from time T on, may depend on his outcomes up to 
time T. And, in general, these outcomes are correlated. 
Formally, given a vector of strategies for G00, f, and a positive integer T, we
define the induced vector of corre]ated strategies f T = (f r, . . .  f�) as follows. M is the
set of length T histories and p is the distribution µf restricted to M. Following a 
history consisting of an initia] message mi followed by hi, fT will randomize over � 
with the same distribution that fi induced in the original game after the history 
obtained by concatenating mi with hi. 
Remark 4.1 .2: Nash Equilibrium Induces Corre]ated Equilibrium in Later Games. . 
It is easy to see that if we start with a Nash equilibrium f, then fT as defined above
is onJy a correlated equilibrium of the repeated game starting at time T, see Lehrer 
(1991). Thus, in genera] games with imperfect monitoring, Nash equilibrium 
"deteriorates" to become on]y correlated equilibrium after time. This observation 
has important implications for learning theories. It suggests that, in general, we can 
at  most hope to converge to correlated equilibrium . 
Clearly, in the construction above, we could have started with a vector of 
correlated equilibrium for G00, to conclude that it induces a correlated equilibrium 
after any time T. 
4.2 The Individual Environment Response Functions of the Repeated Game 
In our stochastic-outcome games, to compute his best response strategy, a 
player does not have to know the game or his co-players' strategies. It suffices to 
know his one person decision problem, induced by the game and their strategies. 
This decision problem can be fully described by an environm ent response function as 
described in Section 3. For example, in the oligopoly game of the previous section, 
if a player knew bis correct price distribution, after every h istory of play and for 
every one of his production levels, be would not need to have any information about 
his opponents and their strategies in order to compute his own optimal strategy. 
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The above obseivation will be especially useful in the next section, where we 
actually assume that the player does not know the game he is playing. But before 
we turn to the equivalent subjective concept, we first describe formally the objective 
notion. 
We consider a repeated stochastic outcome game G00 as in the previous 
section, and a fixed player i. As in Section 3, an environment response function for 
him, ei, describes a probability distribution over his (next) outcomes after every 
history of play obseived by him and an action chosen by him. More precisely, 
e. I (c ) is the probability of his next outcome being ci after observing the individual1 ¥1 i . 
history hi and choosing the action ai. 
When the opponents' strategy vector, f_i, is known, the computation of the 
induced environment function, ei, is straightforward. For every history of length t, 
hi, action ai, and outcome ci, we choose a strategy fi for player i u nder which the 
individual history hi followed by ai has positive probability (or simply let player i play 
the actions of hi up to time t, then ai, and anything afterwards) and let µf be the 
induced distribution on play paths. Then define e. lh (c.) to be the µf conditional1 181 I 
probability of ci being player i's outcome at time t + 1 ,  given the individually
observable play hiai. If under the opponents' strategies, hiai is impossible, no matter 
what strategy player i chooses, then e. I can be defined arbitrarily (since this I h1a1 
situation will not arise). 
Following the discussion above, it is straightforward to conclude the following 
equivalence. 
Proposition 4.2. 1 :  A vector of strategies f is a Nash equilibrium iff each player's 
strategy, fi, is optimal relative to his environment function, ei, induced by f_ i· 
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Clearly, the above discussion and definitions are also applicable to correlated 
versions of the repeated game, with an initial correlated device (M,p ) . In this case, 
as, before, each zero length history consists of a message vector m and all other 
histories, individual or not, start with an initial message. Again, a correlated strategy 
vector f is a correlated equilibrium if and only if each fi is a best response to the 
individual environment functions induced by f_i (this is now in the game with initial 
correlation). 
Equivalently, one can discuss these notions on the strategies induced by initial 
messages. For m1· , a positive probability message for player i, let f and e be his. . � � 
induced ·strategy and environment function after receiving the message mi 
(f� I� = fi I� and e� lhi"i = Ci 1m1h1a1).
Proposition 4.2.2: A vector of correlated strategies in the game (M,p,G00) is a
correlated equilibrium if and only if for every player i and every positive probability 
message mi, f� is optimal relative to em,
·
Proposition 4.2.2 is identical to Proposition 4.2. 1 with the exception that the 
optimization is checked only after the zero length histories. Since the zero length 
histories do not have any payoff, nor strategic choices, checking for optimal behavio� . 
after them involves no loss of generality. 
4.3 The Subjective Game and Equ ilibrium 
In this section we assume that a real game, G00 as defined before, will be 
played, but that the players do not necessarily have fo ll knowledge of the game. We 
assume that they each know his own components, i.e., feasible actions, possible 
consequences, and utility functions. But we do not assume that each player knows 
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his opponents' possible strategies and utility functions. He may not even know who 
his opponents are and how many of them may be playing. 
We model such a situation by assuming that each player holds a subjective 
belief about his environment described by an environment response function, ei, as 
defined in the previous section. The player will choose a strategy fi to be optimal 
relative to the subjective environment function ei. These choices, made by all n­
players, result in a vector of strategies f = (f1, ... ,fn), which, in turn, induce objective .
environments e1, . . . ,en. As we already discussed in Section 3, there is no reason to
assume that ei = ei and if significant differences exist between the subjective and the
objective· distributions induced by them, the player will observe that his assessments 
are wrong, update his subjective beliefs, and modify his strategy. 
However, an equilibrium situation can arise even if ei :;e ei, provided that the
disagreements of the two functions are restricted to be after histories that are not 
observable, i.e., have zero marginal probabilities. When this is the case for each 
player, we are in a subjective equilibrium of the game. 
To make this precise let µ and µf _ be, respectively, the objective andf1,e1 1•e1 
subjective distributions induced on player i 's play paths. 
Definition 4.3. 1 :  Let f = (f1 , . . .  ,fn) be a vector of strategies, and e = ( e1 , . . .  ,en) be  the
induced environment functions. Let e = (e1 , . . .  ,en) be a vector of subjective
environment response functions. The pair (f,e) is a subjective Nash equilibrium of 
the game G 00 if for each player i the following two conditions hold : 
1 .  
2. 
Subjective-Optimization : fi is an optimal response to ei; 
Belief-Confirmation : µ = µ f1,e1 f1,c1·
The beliefs a player holds at the beginning of the game; as described by his 
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subjective environment function ei, may depend on past stochastic observations. 
This dependency was ignored in the single player model of Section 3 since it was 
assumed that the choice of ei already took this past experience into account. 
However, in the multi-person case, if past observations of different players are 
correlated, then it is useful to describe explicitly bow they create correlation in the 
individual belief functions. 
We do this, as before, by amending a correlation device (M,p) to the 
beginning of the game. The subjective correlated game will be described by the real 
correlated game (M,p,G00) but together with beliefs which are message dependent. 
Formally, for each player i and message mi let e describe a (subjective) . � 
environment response function of G00 conjectured by player i. We assume that each 
player chooses a strategies f� as a best response to each em1• These vectors of
individual choices result in a vector of individuai strategies f = (f1 , . . . ,f0) in the game 
with correlation. We let e denote the real environment response function induced m1 
by the vector f on player i , conditional on his initial message mi . 
Defin ition 4.2: A subjective correlated equ il ibrium for G00 consists of a correlation 
device (M,p) as above, with a vector of strategies f = (f1, . . .  ,f0) of (M,p,G00) and a 
vector of (subjective) environment response functions e = (e1 , . . .  ,e0) satisfying for 
each player i and message mi the following two conditions: 
1. Subjective-Optimization : f is a best response to e . ; and ml ml 
2. Correlated Belief-Confirmation : µ = µ fm1-Cm1 fm1•em1• 
Clearly, every Nash equilibrium is a subjective Nash equilibrium, with ei = i\
for all i and, similarly, every correlated equilibrium is a subjective correlated 
equilibrium. However, the fact that the ei's may disagree with the ei's off the play 
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path, makes the set of subjective equilibria significantly larger than the 
corresponding objective notions. Subjective Nash equilibria, which are not Nash 
equilibria, could be of economic interest of their own, as can be seen in the 
following example. 
Example 4.2: Competitive Equilibrium is a Subjective Cournot Equilibrium With 
Finitely Many Producers. Consider a homogeneous-product repeated Cournot 
oligopoly game with n-identical producers. Each producer i has a constant marginal 
production cost of $g!unit, with which he can produce any quantity ai at any of the 
discrete times t = 1 ,2, . . . . The market price in each period is deterministic and 
linear, i.e., p = b - d Ei ai for some positive b and d with b > g. 
Consider a vector of production levels a* = (a� , ... ,a:) resulting in a
competitive market price p = g, i.e., E a� = (b .:.... g)/d. Suppose each player plays a
• • • 
constant strategy f i which prescribes the constant production level a i after every 
history. The vector of strategies f* = (f� , . . . ,f:) is not a Nash equilibrium of the
repeated game since each firm i is making a zero profit which could be increased by 
reducing production. 
Nevertheless, the above production levels are supported by a subjective 
equilibrium of the repeated game, if each of the finitely many players assumes that 
he cannot affect the prices. For example, assume that the outcome reported to each 
player at the end of each period consists of his own production level and realized 
market price. Let each player hold beliefs described by the stationary subjective 
environment response function e. I (g) = 1 .  That is he assumes that withl h1a1 
probability one the market price will be g regardless of past history of prices and 
regardless of his production level. Clearly, producing a� is a best response to such
ei. Moreover, the price sequence (g,g, . . .  ) is assigned probability one by him and,
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indeed, it has probability one under f. So f confirms the beliefs e. Thus, we are in a 
subjective equilibrium. 
It is easy to see in the above model that the only subjective equilibrium which 
is stationary in actions and beliefs is the competitive one. Thus, the only stationary 
subjective equilibrium in the Cournot game is the competitive one. This example 
illustrates that, while subjective equilibrium by itself may allow many outcomes in a 
game, in the presence of additional assumptions on beliefs it may lead to interesting_ 
conclusions. 
Notice that, in the above discussion, the stationarity of beliefs could be 
significantly weakened provided that we keep each player believing that his actions 
do not alter the price distribution. An interesting case of this type is when each 
player believes that tomorrow's price will be what today's price was. 
4.4 Convergence to Subjective Correlated Equilibrium 
In the previous section we justified the notions of subjective Nash, and 
subjective correlated, equilibrium by arguing that players, finding themselves at such 
a situation, will have no reason to alter their beliefs or strategies. In this section we 
present sufficient conditions under which utility-maximizing players must eventually 
play a subjective correlated equilibrium. 
Since the individual strategies, however, may not in general converge to a 
stationary limit strategy, we will follow the same course as we did in the one person 
case, Theorem 3 . 1 .  In other words, we will show that after sufficiently long finite 
time they must play a subjective correlated c-equ ilibrium for arbitrarily small e-.
Defin it ion 4 .4.1 : Let (M,p,G 00) be a correlated game, f a vector of correlated 
strategies, e a vector of correlated subjective environment functions, and c > 0. We 
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say that (f,e) is a subjective correlated 1:-equilibrium if the following conditions 
hold. 
1 . Subjective-Optimization: For every player i and message mi, f is a
Int 
best response to elnt.
2. Correlated 1:-Belief-Confirmation: With probability greater than 
1 - t:, a message vector m will be chosen with µ being 1:-close to fm1•!m1 . 
Before stating the convergence result we recall the terminology of Section 4.1 .
Let f be a vector of strategies of G00, e be the induced vector of environment 
response functions, e be a vector of (subjective) environment response functions, and 
t a  positive integer. The correlated game induced from time t is a correlated game 
(Ht,µ t ,G 00), with Ht denoting all the possible histories of length ·t, and µ t is µf
restricted to the events in Ht. r, et and et are the concepts induced on the 
correlated game by the original game in the natural way, as a lready discussed. 
We say that the players play a subjective correlated e-equilibrium from time t 
on (correlated on the past) if (f ,et) is a subjective correlated e-equilibrium in the 
game (Ht,µt,G00). 
Recalling the definition in Section 3, we say that (fi ,ei) is compatible with 
(fi ,ei) if µ is absolutely continuous with respect to µ _ . The following result is, . r,.e, r,,e, 
mathematically, an immediate consequence of the convergence result for the one 
player case. 
Theorem 4.4.1 : Let f be a vector of strategies and e be a vector of subjective 
environment functions. Suppose f and e satisfy the following two conditions for 
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every player i: 
1. Subjective Optimization: fi is a best response to ei, and
2. Beliefs Compatible with the Truth: (fi,ei) is compatible with (fi,ei)·
Then for every E > 0 there is a time T such that from all times t on, with t :::: T, the 
players play a subjective correlated e-equilibrium. 
Remark 4.4. 1 :  Starting with a Correlated Game. It is easy to see that Theorem 
4.4.1 can . be extended to the case that the original strategies were correlated. That 
is, instead of playing G00 directly, the player starts at time zero with the observation 
of some correlation device and choose their subjectively optimal strategies as best 
response to beliefs which are message dependent. The conclusion, that they will 
eventually play a subjective correlated equilibrium will be identical to the one in the 
statement of the current Theorem 4.4. 1 .  
5. Coincidence of Subjective and Objective Equ ilibria 
The convergence theorem of the previous section illustrates conditions that
must lead the players to a subjective correlated equilibrium. The subjective notion 
of equilibrium is, in most cases, more plausible than the objective counterpart, but it 
entails a reduced prediction power. Since any player may hold his own individual 
hypothesis that justifies his actions, an outside analyst who wants to predict future 
outcomes must collect information about players' subjective beliefs. The potential 
contribution of subjective equilibrium to prediction power depends on the game and 
on players' beliefs. The preliminary examples given here ilJustrate situations, with 
general conditions on beliefs, involving no loss of prediction power when compared 
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to the objective equilibrium. That is, subjective and objective equilibrium predict the 
same behavior. 
5.1 . Optimistic and Pessimistic Conjectures 
In the multi-arm bandit example discussed above, the player does not know 
the real distribution nature uses to determine his outcomes. A suboptimal arm may 
be employed whenever the payoff of other arms are underestimated. In other 
words, subjective equilibrium in this case is not an objective one, since pessimistic 
conjectures regarding unused arms are held. 
The same logic extends to multi-player games, as demonstrated in Example 
2.2. It is natural to expect that, if we rule out pessimistic beliefs, the behavior 
induced by a subjective equilibrium must coincide with the behavior induced by an 
objective one. For this purpose, and later ones, 'we need to introduce the following
notions of equivalence of behavior. 
Two strategy vectors f and g, of G00 (or a correlated version of it in 
of 
(M,P,G00)), play like each other if the distributions they induce on the space17play 
paths, Z00, coincide, i.e., µf = µg. Notice that when this is the case, using any 
statistical tools, none of the players could tell , after observing any initial segment of 
play, or even after watching the infin ite play, whether f or g was played. Moreover, 
even an outside observer with the ability to perfectly monitor all players' actions 
could not distinguish between f and g. This is so because d isagreements between f 
and g can only occur off the play path, thus, with probability zero. 
A weaker concept, to be used later on, is when two strategies f and f' are 
non-distinguishable to the players. This means, as in the notion of belief­
confirmation, that the marginal distributions, on the individual play paths of each 
, 
player, coincide. Formally, let ei and e i  be player i's environment response functions 
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, 
induced by f_ i and f_i, respectively, we require that µr = µr· ., If f and f' are 1,e1 1,e1 
non-distinguishable to the players, they induce the same marginal distributions on 
each player's payoff paths, and thus yield the same utility to each player. However, 
an outsider with full ·monitoring power could observe events to which f and f' assign 
different probability. Our present results use the stronger concept but the weaker 
one can be used in other examples. 
Let f be a vector of strategies of the infinite game, with or without 
correlation, and let ei be the induced environment response function. We say that ei 
has optimistic conjectures relative to f if for every strategy gi, u i(gi,ei) S u i(gi,ei)· 
The following proposition states that whenever agents are optimistic, any 
subjective equilibrium is an objective equilibrium. 
Proposition 5. 1 :  Let (f,e) be a subjective correlated (resp. Nash) equilibrium with 
each ei holding optimistic conjectures relative to f. Then f is a correlated (resp. 
Nash) equilibrium. 
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that fi is not optimal against the real ei. Therefore, 
there exists a strategy gi of player i satisfying u i(gi,ei) > ui(fi ,ei)· However, by the 
optimistic conjecture assumption, ui(gi ,t \) � u(gi,ei)· Moreover, since (f,e). is a 
subjective equilibrium, u i(fi ,ei) = ui(fi,ei)· As we combine the first two inequalities 
with the last equality we get u i(gi,ei) > ui(fi ,ei), which contradicts the optimality of fi 
against ei. This concludes the proof. II 
That each player holds subjective beliefs, an ei, with optimistic conjectures 
relative to the actual play is a strong requirement. Yet without imposing some 
conditions that make players' conjectures realistic--or, better, yet, optimistic--one 
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may sustain any behavior by a subjective equilibrium. However, the following 
familiar economic model illustrates that, under some general assumptions, subjective 
and objective equilibria generate the same behavior pattern. 
Example 5.2. Subjective Cournot Equilibrium Plays Like Cournot Equilibrium:  We 
consider n-producers (players) of an identical product in a market with a commonly 
known downward sloping demand function, D( • ) . 
To fit our model, and to simplify the exposition, we make the following 
assumptions. The set of outcomes, prices in this case, consists of all nonnegative 
rationals; ·Thus, Ci is a countable set for i = l, . . . ,n. Similarly, we let all players have
the same set of actions, feasible production levels, Ai = {0,1,2, . . . } .  We assume that 
in each period the market price is established deterministicaHy according to the 
vector of production levels, a = (a1, ... ,an), by c � D(I ai)· We also assume for 
simplicity that they each have a constant and positive marginal production costs, K. 
So if in a given period a player produces at a level ai and the realized market price 
(determined by all production levels) is c, his period . net profit is ai�iK. 
We let (M,P,G00) be the above game with some initial correlation device 
(M,P) describing the distribution of information available to the players prior to the 
start of the game. We assume that (f,e) is a subjective correlated equilibrium. Thus,. 
each f is a best response to e and µ = µ where e is the rea] � ml fm1•�m1 fm1•em/ m1 
environment response function determined by the game and the other player's 
strategies, given mi, while e is the one induced by the subjective conjecture of i. m1 
We assume that each player knows the demand function. Formally, we do it 
by assuming that for every A the distribution e I coincides with the m1 h1(•1•A) 
distribution D(D -1(e I ) + A.). Notice that this rules out the price takingml h111 
assumption we used to obtain the competitive prices at a subjective equilibrium. 
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Our goal now is to show that f plays like some g which is a correlated 
equilibrium, or equivalently, a Nash equilibrium of (M,P,G00). 
We construct g = (g1, ... ,gn) as follows. For each player i, after every history, 
h i, which has a µf-positive probability we define gi to coincide with fi, i .e. , 
g1 l1ii = f1 l1ii· Notice that this implies that g plays like f. For µf zero probability
histories, hi, define g1 lhi to choose a large production level L with probability one.
The level L is chosen in such a way that the amount (n - 1 )L, produced by n - 1 
producers, lowers market price below the marginal cost, K. 
By the definition of g for every player i, f and g play alike. That is, player i 
cannot tell the difference between f and g because they induce the same distribution 
over the signals observed by player i. 
In order to show that g is an equilibrium, we show that for every possible 
I I 
deviation, gi , of player i, ui(gi ,ei) s ui(gi,ei), where ei is the environment function 
induced by g_ i. 
I 
We will show that g i  is not a profitable deviation by showing that the outcome 
I I 
generated by (g i ,ei) could be generated by some fi and ei. Since fi is individually 
I I 
optimal (against ei), ui(fi ,ei) :::: u i(fi,ei) = ui(gi ,ei)· As ui(fi ,ei) = ui(gi,ei) because f 
I 
and g play alike, we conclude that ui(g,ei) :::: u i(gi,ej). 
Recall the demand function, D, is commonly known and that it has a negative 
slope. Suppose that after the history hi the strategy fi prescribes player i the action 
ai with positive probability. Since f is a subjective equilibrium player i knows to 
predict the distribution over prices given his own ai . As D is one-to-one, player i is 
able to forecast after hi the distribution over the quantity produced by all his . 
competitors. Therefore, he knows to predict the distribution over prices not only 
given ai, but also given any other quantity player i may produce. We now deduce 
that after every history with positive probability (w.r.t. to f) player i knows the 
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I 
distribution over prices induced by (gi,ei)· In other words, the distribution over 
, , 
prices induced by (gi,ei) is the one induced by (gi,ei) after every history with positive 
probability. By iterating the same argument we infer that the probability assigned to 
f I 
history hi by (gi,ei) and by (gi,ei) is the same, provided that hi bas a (gi,ei)-positive 
probability. 
, 
Define f i(hi) to be identical to gi(hi) for every history hi which is positive 
, , , 
w.r.t. (gi,ei)· Otherwise, fi(hj) is zero. We will show that ui(fi,ei) � ui(g i,ei)· Fix a 
time t and let hi be a history of length t. Conditioned on hi being (gi,ei)-positive we 
f f I 
get that ui(fi,ei)� which by definition equals ui(gi,ei), is equal to u i(gi,ei)· As for 
every other history hi, since fi(hj) = 0, the return for player i is zero. On the other 
hand, the payoff ui(gi,ei) is at most zero (after hi) because the total amount 
produced by all players drops market price below the cost per unit. Therefore, 
, 
conditioned on hi being a history with probabilit}' zero (w.r.t (gi,ei)) 0 = u i(fi,ei) �
ui(gi ,ei) · 
, 
We may conclude that at any period t u i(fi ,ei) � ui(gi,ei) and therefore this is 
the case for the whole repeated game. This completes the proof, showing that g is 
an equilibrium. 
6. Subjective Extensive Form Games
In the previous sections we restricted the subjective approach to repeated
stochastic-outcome games. The extension to general extensive form games is straightforward . 
We need only to modify the definition of the environment response functions. 
Recall that e. 1h (c.) represented the probability that outcome c1· will be realized byI 1•1 I 
player i after the play consisting of the individual history hi followed by the action ai . 
The role of bi's in the above must be replaced by the player's information sets. For 
every information set hi, the ai's following it must be restricted to actions feasible at 
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this information set. The consequences, ci's in the above, can be replaced by two 
objects. They could be terminal nodes with their associated payoffs, when the action 
ai taken at hi can lead to such termination. They could also describe new individual 
information sets if following hiai the other players could lead player i to a "next" 
information set. 
The following example illustrates such a generalization and its usefulness 
without the need to develop the general terminology of extensive form games. 
Consider a three stage alternating offer bargaining between a seller and a 
buyer. At stage one the seller can ask the buyer for two prices, . H or L. In the 
second stage, the buyer can accept the asked price, X, with X = H or X = L, 
yielding the respective payoffs X - Rs, Rb - X, where Rs and Rb represent the
respective reservation values. Or the buyer can counter propose two prices, CA or
CB, which the seller than accepts or rejects. If Cx is accepted, X = A or X = B.
Again ,  the respective payoffs are Cx - R5, Rb - Cx· If it is declined, the resulting
payoffs are 0 and 0. 
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The extensive form game has the following simple representation. 
-
CA s l 
I _ _,_ 
-pt 
H B CB s 1 
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The decision tree of the seller has the following structure. 
� 
CA s l  
I lt'Oj-
-� 
H 0 CB s l 
I zej-
accepted 
Stan s �Led 
accept 
0 CA s l L I rcjoot 
aocept 
CB s l 1 -J-
His subjective environment response function will specify six probabilities 
corresponding to the six arcs marked accepted, CA and CB. For example, es I L 
(accepted) represents the probability that a seller's initial low offer of L will be 
accepted, and es I 8(C A) represents the probability that an initi.a l  H offer will be
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responded to with a counteroffer CA· 
How�ver, different games will give rise to the same decision tree of the seller 
as illustrated by the following two scenarios. 
Scenario 1 :  The buyer consists of two players, b1 and b2, with hierarchical decision
making. Upon hearing the asked price X, player b1 can accept, counter-propose CA'
counter-propose CB, or pass the decision to b2. If b1 passes, then b2 decides
whether to accept, or counter with CA or C8. Now there are three reservation
values, and if the item is sold at price P, the respective payoffs are (P - Rs,
�1 - P, ·� - P). 
Notice that the only concern to the seller are the probabilities given by his 
environment response function and not the process of the decision making by the 
group of buyers. We could construct a large number of scenarios, like the one 
above, all of which constitute different game trees with different possible interacting 
buyers, but all yielding the same individual decision tree for the seller. 
Scenario 2: A Bayesian game with unknown buyer's reservation value. Suppose the 
single buyer has two possible reservation values chosen according to some prior 
probabilities. The buyer knows the realized value, but the seller does not. · Now we 
have two versions of the original game, with nature moving first and choosing which 
of the two trees to enter. The buyer knows which tree natures chooses, but the 
seller does not. Every pair of corresponding nodes in the two trees are put together 
for him in a single information set. 
Nevertheless, his individual decision tree is unchanged and all he cares to 
know are the probabilities of his offers being accepted or countered. 
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When we combine variations, as in Scenarios 1 and 2 together, we see that 
there is a large number of games, all yielding the seller the same individual decision 
tree, and all he needs are the assessments in this one decision tree of the probability 
of various responses ·to his offers. 
The buyer has a similar task. The real game induces on him a known decision 
tree. To decide on his optimal strategy, he needs to assess probabilities of how the 
seller (or sellers or sellers-agents) will respond to bis counter offers . .  
The subjective extensive game consists of the real game together with the two 
decision trees and individually assessed environment response functions. 
A. subjectively optimal strategy consists of optimal choices in the individual
decision tree relative to the assessed responses. A vector of such strategies is a 
subjective equilibrium if all subjective forecasts over future individual outcomes are 
accurate. Assessments off the play path do not have to be accurate. 
For example, suppose the seller assesses probabilities 1 to his proposed L 
price being countered with CA· He also holds assessments regarding the 
probabilities of response to his proposal H price which leads him to a subjective 
optimal strategy of proposing L and accepting any counter proposal. The buyer, due 
to his own assessments, chooses an optimal strategy which indeed counters L with a 
CA offer. If the buyer's beliefs are that the seller will offer L and accept a .counter
proposal CA, then we are at a subjective equilibrium. Every player's expectations on
the play path are met, even though their conjectures regarding off path responses 
may be wrong. 
The above subjective equilibrium is closely related to earlier examples in 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1988) and to self-confirming equilibrium in the Fudenberg­
Levine (1993) sense. 
A major difference is that the players are not assumed to know the game. 
53 
For example, the real game could be as in Scenario 1 above, yet with the seller 
behaving and if he is in the original game facing a single buyer. 
Another interesting discrepancy between the players' model of the game and 
the actual  game may be regarding the continuation of the game. The buyer may 
think that the game may continue with additional offers and counter-offers, yet the 
seller thinking that he must make a final response to the buyer's counter-offer. 
Since at the equilibrium proposal above the game ends after the buyer's counter­
offer, whichever of them is wrong regarding the possibility or impossibility of 
continuation will never find out. 
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